Chinese drone makers dispatch engineers and strike UAVs to sanctioned Russian arms conglomerate IEMZ Kupol
中国无人机制造商向受制裁俄军工巨头“库波尔”派遣工程师并输送攻击型机型
- Corporate invoices and flight manifests confirmed Chinese drone manufacturers Sichuan AEE and Hunan Haotianyi delivered one-way attack drones and flight control computers to sanctioned Russian arms maker IEMZ Kupol. 企业发票与航行记录证实，中国无人机制造商四川一电航空（Sichuan AEE）与湖南浩天翼向受制裁的俄罗斯军工综合体“库波尔”交付了单向攻击型自杀式无人机及飞控系统计算机。
- Chinese engineers made over half a dozen trips to Kupol's Izhevsk plant and the Chebarkul military test range, masquerading as employees of Russian front company TSK Vektor to conduct live strike drone trials. 中国工程师曾六次以上往返于“库波尔”位于伊热夫斯克的军工制造厂与切巴尔库尔军事靶场，伪装成俄罗斯影子空壳公司“TSK Vektor”雇员参与实弹打击试验。
- The joint development of the Garpiya-3 and adaptation of anti-jamming UAVs demonstrate how Beijing maintains plausible deniability while private Chinese aerospace suppliers replenish Russia's frontline war machine. 双方联合研发“鹰身女妖-3”（Garpiya-3）无人机并升级抗干扰战术，表明北京在维持“合理推诿”外交借口的同时，私营中国航空航天供应链正全力为莫斯科的前线战争机器输血。
Chinese drone manufacturers Sichuan AEE and Hunan Haotianyi dispatched engineers and strike drones to sanctioned Russian arms conglomerate IEMZ Kupol, The Straits Times reported. The paper trail is definitive. Leaked corporate invoices, bank statements, and flight manifests revealed that Chinese technical teams made repeated trips to Kupol’s Izhevsk factory and the Chebarkul military test range to assemble attack UAVs and calibrate anti-jamming flight computers. Air tickets confirmed Hunan Haotianyi chief executive Liu Mingxing flew alongside Russian procurement handlers to facilitate the transfer of HW52V strike drones for deployment in Ukraine.
The operation demonstrates calculated pretextual cloaking. Russian procurement front TSK Vektor billed millions of yuan for the shipments while disguising Chinese aerospace technicians as its own payroll staff during live-fire trials. That subterfuge mirrors how state-backed trading houses previously routed machine tools and aviation components through Central Asian shell companies to evade Western tracking. Here, officials refined dual-use evasion into an active industrial partnership, migrating from passive component deliveries to supervised flight testing of the long-range Garpiya-3 attack drone inside Russian airspace.
By running lethal weapons collaboration through provincial commercial suppliers, party leaders secure strategic influence in Moscow while feigning strict diplomatic neutrality on the global stage. Plausible deniability remains the goal. Yet when secondary trade sanctions crash down on mainland manufacturing hubs, ordinary factory workers and private entrepreneurs will absorb the economic fallout while party-state officials escape unpunished. Clandestine defense contracts cannot hide the reality of a regime underwriting foreign aggression.
据《海峡时报》报道，中国无人机制造企业四川一电航空（Sichuan AEE）与湖南浩天翼向受国际制裁的俄罗斯军工巨头“库波尔”（IEMZ Kupol）派遣了技术工程师并交付了攻击型无人机。商业证据确凿无疑。泄露的公司发票、银行对账单及航班出入境清单显示，中方技术团队曾频繁出入“库波尔”位于伊热夫斯克的装配车间与切巴尔库尔军事靶场，协助组装自杀式无人机并校准抗干扰飞控电脑。机票信息进一步证实，湖南浩天翼高管刘明星曾与俄罗斯军火采购代理人同机飞行，以此推动HW52V型攻击无人机交付用于乌克兰前线。
这一整套地下运作展现了经过精密设计的“借口伪装掩护”。俄罗斯采购前台公司“TSK Vektor”就相关批次开具了数千万元人民币的结算款项，同时在实弹试飞期间将中国航空技术人员身份包装为该公司的注册员工。这种瞒天过海的策略与此前国有外贸企业借道中亚皮包公司转运高精度机床和航空零部件以规避西方监控的手法如出一辙。在此案例中，涉事各方将“军民两用规避”手法精炼成一种主动的军工产业协作伙伴关系，彻底从被动的散件出口蜕变为在俄罗斯领空内进行全程技术指导的“鹰身女妖-3”（Garpiya-3）远程攻击无人机飞行试验。
通过借道地方私营商业供应商开展致命性武器研发合作，执政当局既在莫斯科手中锁定了关键战略影响力，又在国际舞台上佯装恪守外交中立。维持“合理推诿”（Plausible Deniability）始终是其核心目的。然而，一旦西方的二级贸易制裁大棒挥向中国本土的制造业基地，承担沉重经济代价的将是普通的产业工人和民营企业家，而幕后操盘的党政官员却能毫发无损。见不得光的军工秘密合同，掩盖不了国家力量暗中支撑对外军事侵略的严峻现实。
On Weibo and Douyin, nationalist commentators celebrated reports of Russian battlefield successes with Chinese drone parts, circulating memes boasting that Russian forces rely on Chinese manufacturing dominance to bypass Western sanctions. Commentators on military discussion boards like Tiexue and Zhihu openly mocked European diplomatic inquiries, arguing that private commercial transactions between independent firms are none of NATO's business: 'If we can sell tractors, we can sell engines.' In contrast, discussions among export compliance professionals on WeChat expressed anxiety over widening Western secondary sanctions, warning that Washington and Brussels will inevitably blacklist entire tiers of Chinese electronics suppliers and private drone manufacturers.
在微博与抖音上，民族主义评论员纷纷为俄罗斯战场上出现的中国无人机零部件捷报喝彩，转发各种将俄罗斯规避西方制裁归功于“中国制造碾压优势”的段子。铁血社区与知乎等军事论坛上的网民公开嘲讽欧洲的外交质询，辩称民营企业之间的独立商业往来轮不到北约插手：“我们既然能卖拖拉机，为什么不能卖发动机？”然而，微信群内的出口合规专业人士却普遍流露出对西方二级制裁不断扩大的焦虑，担忧华盛顿和布鲁塞尔将不可避免地把大批中国电子元器件供应商和民用无人机生产商列入全链条黑名单。
The Cyberspace Administration of China issued immediate censorship guidance to online platforms, barring any republication or translation of European intelligence disclosures regarding Russian weapons programs inside China. Discussions linking domestic drone firms Sichuan AEE or Hunan Haotianyi to military procurement in Russia were scrubbed from Baidu search results and Weibo search terms. State media outlets like Xinhua and CCTV maintained complete silence on the revelations, broadcasting only Foreign Ministry spokesperson Mao Ning's boilerplate assertion that China strictly regulates dual-use drone exports and maintains neutral trade relations with all parties.
中央网信办向各大商业平台下发紧急审查指令，全面封禁转载或翻译欧洲关于俄罗斯在华武器采购项目的情报披露。在百度搜索与微博热搜中，任何将本土无人机企业“四川一电”或“湖南浩天翼”与俄罗斯军工采购关联的信息均被过滤抹除。新华社与央视等官媒对此保持一致沉默，对外仅单向传播外交部发言人毛宁的例行表态，即宣称中方对军民两用无人机实施严格出口管制，并与各方保持中立正常的经贸往来。
In July 2024, China's Ministry of Commerce enacted export controls on civilian drones with high-precision inertial measurement units and engines exceeding 16 kilowatts, framing the move as responsible nonproliferation. However, investigative reporting by Reuters and corporate registries show that Russian procurement fronts like TSK Vektor circumvented these restrictions by sourcing through private provincial manufacturers under civilian drone categories. The Garpiya drone series—first the A1 variant powered by Xiamen Limbach engines and subsequently the G3 model tested in China—has been used to bombard Ukrainian energy infrastructure, marking an operational shift from illicit component sales to direct collaborative weapons development.
2024年7月，中国商务部对搭载高精度惯性测量单元（IMU）以及功率超过16千瓦发动机的民用无人机实施出口管制，将此举包装为负责任的防扩散举措。然而路透社调查与工商登记信息显示，诸如“TSK Vektor”之类的俄罗斯采购影子中间商，借由民营地方制造商在民用无人机品类下的灰色通道轻松规避了这些限制。从早期搭载厦门林巴贺发动机的“鹰身女妖-A1”型号，到在中国完成测试的G3机型，该系列无人机已被广泛用于轰炸乌克兰关键能源设施，标志着这一地下合作已从非法的散装零部件贸易升级为直接的协同武器研发。